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Sigma Ratings: Adapting the Credit Rating Agency Model for the Anti-Money 
Laundering World 
 
Purpose: Sigma Ratings is a new entrant to the AML marketplace and seeks to alleviate some 
of the inherent flaws within the AML regime. This paper exists to examine those flaws and 
ask whether Sigma may succeed in this bourgeoning marketplace. 
Design/Methodology: This paper is based upon a normative methodology, which takes place 
after reviewing the relevant literature in order to examine the potential success for Sigma 
Ratings. 
Findings: The paper finds that there is indeed a position for Sigma Ratings in the 
marketplace, and that it may alleviate key issues within the AML Regime. 
Originality: The paper presents Sigma Ratings to the literature for the first time and positions 
this against an examination of the role of banks within AML – Sigma’s main demographic. 
 
Introduction 
 
The regulations and laws governing the world of anti-money laundering processes are 
extensive, and the literature surrounding the field even more so. Particularly with regards to 
the literature, there are a number of theoretical perspectives advanced for either how to 
progress the system of anti-money laundering, or to show why the current system is 
ineffective. In this article however we will be examining a practical response to perceived 
issues within the AML process from the private sector. By adapting the model utilised so 
successfully by the leading credit rating agencies, the new offering Sigma Ratings exists to 
compliment the current AML regime by injecting independent and quantifiable data into the 
process so that associated parties may be more efficient in the battle against money 
laundering. 
 
Theoretically this new offering is very welcome. The potential in allowing associated parties 
to become more efficient in dealing with entities that may be used as vehicles for money 
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laundering is positive. However, there are a number of issues to examine before declaring 
whether this new venture will be a success, both from the side of Sigma and its model, and 
also from the side of its potential role in the AML environment. In order to remain focused on 
the task at hand, this article will concentrate on the role that banks play in the AML regime, 
mainly because a large bank is funding the new offering (Barclays), a number of banks have 
recently been financially punished for their failings within the AML regime, and also because 
the banking industry has been identified in the literature as a particularly important ‘pinch-
point’ for which money laundering can occur. The article will progress on the basis of first 
presenting the concept of money laundering and the fight against it, which will allow us to 
understand clearer the need to focus on the banking industry. To accompany that analysis, the 
article will continue by examining the role of the banking industry in more detail, so that we 
may better understand the potential role of Sigma Ratings. That will allow us to both examine 
Sigma Ratings’ offering in the right context, but also ascertain its chances of succeeding 
based upon its prospective model. In adjoining that analysis to a discussion on the inherent 
issues within the concept of credit rating as an agency, as Sigma have essentially copied the 
same model, the article will conclude by discussing some potential concerns that Sigma may 
have to overcome in order to provide the AML regime with the assistance it claims it can. 
 
Money Laundering and the Fight against It 
 
It is far beyond the scope of this article to review the literature on money laundering. Even 
though money laundering as a concept is only around 30 years old, most countries around the 
world now have anti-money laundering legislation and regulation and there is a gluttony of 
associated literature to help us understand it (Booth et al., 2011). Yet, there are a number of 
definitions and theoretical constructs that can help us build a picture as to why an 
organisation like Sigma may be helpful. Booth et al discuss how the late 1980s laid the 
groundwork for the AML regime we know today as a response to the ‘immense profits being 
made by drug cartels in South America and elsewhere’ (ibid). Gilmour continues this line of 
reasoning by suggesting that ‘manifested from a need to secure the profitability and the 
enjoy-ability of illicitly gained financial funds, money laundering has become instrumental in 
both the success and collapse of organised crime’ (Gilmour, 2016a). That suggestion is 
confirmed when we consider that global estimates have indicated that more than a trillion 
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dollars has been laundered (which equates to 2.7% of global GDP) and that the industry of 
money laundering is the world’s third largest behind oil and agriculture (Gilmour, 2016b). 
 
It has been argued that there is a common core amongst the variety of jurisdictions that 
implement AML procedures and that they all mostly derive from the 40 Recommendations of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). That common core can be broken down into three 
distinct sections of a ‘three-stage process’: Placement; Layering; and Integration (Booth et 
al., 2011). Placement describes the process whereby large amounts of cash are deposited into 
the banking system. It has been noted that this has become increasingly difficult over times as 
the AML requirements on banks grow stronger and stronger. It has also been noted that 
‘smurfing’, which describes the process whereby small amounts of money will be deposited 
with a bank over time to disguise the large amount, is also becoming increasingly difficult. 
The second stage is to ‘layer’, which describes when repeated transfers of money are 
undertaken between accounts with financial institutions in different jurisdictions. This usually 
takes place within jurisdictions with poorer AML requirements as the aim is to conceal the 
criminal origin of the funds via the organisational capacity of the institution. Finally, to 
complete the process, the now apparently clean money is placed in a reputable bank or 
financial institution from which the funds can now be withdrawn and invested in the manner 
the criminal enterprise sees fit (ibid). 
 
Since the 1980s when drug cartels became the inspiration for a new concerted effort to battle 
the laundering of illicitly-gained money, there has been a development that has created just as 
much attention. Terrorist financing is now just as important as any other source of money 
laundering and the FATF have developed 9 Recommendations on how to fight it. Terrorist 
financing is very different to the usual type of money laundering institutions have to battle 
against, in that whilst money laundering is about the cleansing of dirty money to be used 
legitimately, terrorist financing is about the misuse of clean, or dirty, money for terrorist 
purposes. Whilst normal money laundering has a number of related effects, but which need to 
be sought out in order to examine them i.e. the potential statistical impact of the loss of tax 
revenue, or the proliferation of criminal enterprises, for example, the results of terrorist 
financing have a clearly demonstrable effect once a terrorist attack takes place (ibid). 
Furthermore, this sentiment has been developed with the increase in international sanctions 
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against countries like Iran for financing terrorism, or against countries like North Korea for 
nuclear proliferation (Levin et al., 2016). The picture this paints is one of tremendous 
complexity that financial institutions have to face in a number of elements of their business. It 
is apparent that the understanding of AML can be differentiated between that of the 
perpetrator and that of the institution who would be utilised as the vehicle for laundering 
money. 
 
This dichotomy is represented in the literature. The concept of money laundering has been 
analysed from within a massive number of parameters, including Game Theory, Systems 
Theory, Evolutionary Game Theory, Self-Protecting Theory, and many more. In this article 
we shall focus on a small number of associated theories, and demonstrate that there is a 
contrasting view in the literature between that of the actions of the individual(s) who seeks to 
launder money, and that of the system designed to prevent that from happening. A Game 
Theory approach suggests that people and organisations involved in the instance of money 
laundering can be represented within a ‘game’ like scenario, where avoidance of detection 
and the rewards for doing so are counterbalanced by the penalties that have been developed. 
Not only does this apply to the criminal entities who must launder their money before they 
spend it, but to the banks who have to weigh up the costs of non-compliance, or at least a 
reduced level of compliance, against the financial recompense of being involved in the $1 
trillion-plus marketplace (Jayantilal et al., 2017). This is not to say that Banks wilfully 
partake in money laundering of course, because for one they have the potential reputational 
impact on top of any regulatory impact to consider, but the costs of compliance may be too 
high against the lack of any recompense for diligent compliance. Araujo (2010) suggests that 
this model is better suited to the ‘Evolutionary Game Theory’ model on account of the 
massive number of factors that impact upon the players within this ‘game’. Not only do the 
organisations have to consider a number of variables with regards to their approach to 
battling money laundering, but the organisation’s many employees have to consider a number 
of variables also, and particularly those within compliance departments. There may be a 
personal cost for being too stringent, but that is counterbalanced by a regime that is 
particularly punitive towards compliance professionals which may lead to a lack of 
compliance, according to Georgiou (2017). 
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However, whilst some theorists examine the roles of individuals and organisations, others 
prefer to focus on a much bigger picture. It has been suggested that anti-money laundering ‘is 
a demanding research domain that is interdisciplinary in its core’ (Demetis, 2010) and 
Demetis subscribes to a theory that he argues is an amalgamation of a number of those 
disciplines. Systems Theory, as Demetis understands it, is a ‘collection of highly abstract 
concepts that can be applied to a series of problem domains’ and that, if used appropriately, 
‘can give considerable insights’ (ibid). With regards to AML, the Systems Theory can be 
understood by first assessing an oversimplification. In separating the regulation of the field 
into three categories – local, national, and transnational –we can witness an AML hierarchy 
that functions according to a designed set of well-specified rules; where there is a problem, 
that problem will be overcome by specifying more rules, and failing that by formal 
legislation. That tiered process starts with organisations like the FATF, the EU, the UN, the 
IMF and so on. The authority that emanates from that level is deemed to be constitutive of the 
broader AML domain, which is why it is responsible for norm-setting (ibid). In terms of 
implementing those norms, national-level organisations like Central Banks come into play 
and implement the norms in relation to the culture they operate in. These national-level 
players are also in charge of monitoring the local level players, like local banks. However, 
Systems Theory argues that this is far too simple for something as complex as the AML 
regime, on account of the large number of external factors that affect the entire domain. 
Demetis suggests that it may be better to think of it in terms of overlapping subsystems – the 
legal subsystem, the economic subsystem, and the political subsystem. The theory is that 
whilst these subsystems have their own complexities, they can penetrate each other via 
communication and, as a result, create a new structure. With AML sitting in between these 
three structures, the result is for all three to inform the development of the AML structure. 
The political informs AML via the momentum to develop the structure, via such aspects as 
political action. If we think of the Trump Administration’s focus on Iran and imposing 
sanctions for terrorist financing, we can see here a stimuli that informs the process and starts 
the mechanism (Ritter, 2018). The economic system informs the process via the rules relating 
to the vehicles within the AML domain, like banks and other financial institutions for 
example. Finally, the legal system informs the AML domain via the concept of illegality and, 
thus, gives rise to the ‘ontological status of money laundering’ (Demetis, 2010). 
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Accepting the importance of this Systems Theory viewpoint for one moment, it appears that a 
number of inefficiencies stem from a misunderstanding of the systemic nature of the AML 
domain. Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes (2015) question whether the legal sphere matters in the 
AML context because it tends to target the outcome of money laundering, rather than the 
reason for it – it focuses on the symptom, not the cause. Araujo (2010) argues that one aspect 
of any perceived failure of the AML regime is that it has failed to fully integrate the banking 
system as a result of prescribing the rules to it, rather than with it. We shall review the issue 
of the banking sector shortly, but the inefficiencies are essentially systemic inefficiencies 
stemming from a lack of cohesion within the system. Systems Theory is easily applied to the 
domain of AML although there is room for other considerations. 
 
Before we analyse the role of the banking industry, there are a number of theoretical 
perspectives that demonstrate both the importance of the sector to the AML regime, but also 
the difficulties that the sector face. Demitis and Angell (2007) discuss how, if one considers 
the AML regime from a System perspective, the system can be differentiated by a distinction 
between suspicious and non-suspicious, and the consequences of distinction. Whilst there are 
some base rules on what constitutes suspicious behaviour, it is still far too subjective in order 
for the regime to be clinical. Furthermore, whilst banks are subjected to an array of different 
regulations and laws, it is has been noted that there is a massive divergence in terms of 
contextualised expectation. For example, Ebikake (2016) identifies that whilst the common 
understanding of ‘soft law’ is that one is given a ‘considerable degree of discretion as regards 
implementation’, the reality within the AML regime is that such ‘soft laws’ are incredibly 
prescriptive and detailed, arguably rendering them as ‘hard law’. Ebikake positions this 
against the theoretical resolutions developed by positivists like H.L.A. Hart, but in doing so 
develops the idea that it is important, potentially, to be descriptive within the AML regime 
because of the broadness of the system. In developing the criminological theory of situational 
crime prevention however, Gilmour (2016b) reaffirms the importance of the banking sector 
to the AML regime and the reason for why so many rules and regulations operate through the 
banking sector. He states that the underlying basis of situational crime prevention theory is to 
assess the entire environment within the given area, in this case money laundering, and 
develop a methodology that identifies ‘points of intervention’ so that the system can capture 
multiple versions of the same crime at once, rather than aim for just one crime. This is 
rational in that there are a number of versions of financial crime that need to be eradicated. It 
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should be obvious that one of the best ‘points of intervention’ available to the AML regime, 
or ‘choke-points’ (Campbell-Verduyn, 2018), is the banking sector and, as such, it has been 
moved into the central position in the fight against money laundering. However, there are a 
number of issues with this, and the facts that money laundering is continuing almost unabated 
and the banks are receiving massive fines for non-compliance suggest that the current system 
is inefficient. As Sigma aims to increase that inefficiency, it is worth examining the role of 
banks before we are introduced to Sigma and its offering to the marketplace. 
 
The Role of the Banking Sector 
 
As stated above, the banks are considered as ‘choke-points’ for the delivery of AML 
procedures. Theoretically, this makes sense. However, in practice, the situation is much 
different. The underlying reason for this is that banks are for-profit private institutions for the 
most part, and complying with such an array of rules is a costly business. It has been noted 
that the banks were ‘unwillingly recruited’ (Bello, 2017) into the AML regime, and if we 
consider the length and breadth of the rules and regulations that the sector must comply with, 
or face massive penalties, it is not hard to see why.  
 
In contrasting the Systems Theory viewpoint discussed earlier, Georgiou (2017) suggests that 
the co-mingling of the political and economic spheres is actually an example of ‘government 
failure’ or ‘overreach’ in that the political sphere has developed a new strand to be developed 
without any economic foundation. He talks specifically of the War on Terror engaged in 
since the attacks of 9/11, which has seen a massive increase in resources to fight such aspects 
of money laundering, but has seen ‘no evident reduction in illicit money flows worldwide’. 
The suggestion is that this is also down to a conflation of terminologies in the sector, with a 
number of aspects being defined as ‘money laundering’, but also that current efforts are being 
driven by the fear associated with anti-terror initiatives rather than white-collar crime, which 
Georgiou argues may be the reason why banking staff are less likely to fully pursue an AML 
issue in that particular field. Yet, he is clear that financial intermediary ‘agents’ have been 
caught in the middle of the rush to develop AML regimes that are effective, and that this goes 
against the self-perceived role of the sector. If the sector do see themselves as ‘facilitators’ 
8 
 
rather than ‘policemen’, then engaging them in the mould the norm-setters require will be 
particularly difficult. 
 
It is in those norms, developed from the transnational entities and implemented by national 
bodies, that we see where the problem lays when applied by private entities. One of the most 
well-known concepts within the AML framework is the concept of ‘know-your-customer’ 
(KYC). This term describes when a bank must verify a customer’s identity and monitor their 
transactions if a suspicion is raised. This also applies to ‘smurfing’, and then also to larger 
issues such as those who have been placed on a ‘blacklist’ via some sanction. This process is 
automated for the most part, but once certain criteria are triggered the bank’s management are 
alerted and the decision is then made on whether to escalate the issue. This has had a number 
of connected consequences and many feed into a lack of engagement between the banks and 
the AML regime. The first is that private banking, or wealth management, is fundamentally 
affected by the process. Wealth management, which is lucrative for the banks, is based upon 
a traditional culture of confidentiality, ‘difficulty in identifying beneficial owners, 
concealment (use of offshore trusts), banking secrecy, complexity of financial services and 
products, politically exposed persons (PEPs), high-value transactions, and multiple 
jurisdictions’ (ibid). This issue of jurisdictional access is also massively important, especially 
in relation to Sigma Ratings and the current predicaments facing the banking sector, as 
‘Correspondent Banking’ – banks that provide services in a certain jurisdiction on behalf of 
another bank (Tarbet and Liangshun, 2016) – is becoming one of the primary reasons for 
leading banks to fall foul of the AML regulations (Justice Department, 2012; Justice 
Department, 2015) and, potentially, one of the key ways in which Sigma can reduce costs and 
raise efficiency in the sector. In order for the banks to know they are complying with the 
AML regulations whilst undertaking aspects of wealth management or correspondent 
banking, they must perform either Customer Due Diligence (CDD), or Enhanced Due 
Diligence (EDD). CDD entails identifying the customer, verifying those details 
independently, and then understanding the nature of the business to be conducted. EDD 
however entails the same scrutiny initially, but then escalates to additional searches (adverse 
media perhaps) and then to a commissioned intelligence report. To accompany all of this the 
source of the funds in question must be independently verified. Georgiou discusses how the 
AML authorities will argue that the EDD is only required in a few cases and that the 
simplified due diligence is usually appropriate. However, the burden of proof is on the banks. 
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All of this accumulates into the key sticking point with regards to the engagement of the 
banks with the AML regime – cost. 
 
The vast amount of research needed to comply with AML regulations is having an adverse 
effect upon the costs of banking. Additionally, the compliance departments of the banks are 
being overburdened, and disproportionally so according to Georgiou, and to Levin et al 
(2018). Levin and her colleagues argue that there is a massive shift against compliance 
officials, with those officials being ‘threatened with liability for failure to detect or prevent 
wrongdoing because of poor management, oversight, or program gaps’ (ibid). They continue 
by discussing how even when compliance officers lack the necessary authority, regulators 
still expect them to educate senior executives and raise issues with senior management. 
Georgiou adds to this that the responsibility to train and inform relevant individuals falls on 
the compliance team and that they should have access to all of the information available to 
the business, across the domestic, international, and subsidiary businesses. This has naturally 
led to the banks complaining of the increased costs and burden placed upon them. In 
response, the AML domain has attempted to sweeten the deal for the banks by offering them 
something in return. There is a concerted push to open up traditionally untapped markets to 
the banks – termed by some as ‘banking the unbanked’ – via an initiative called ‘Financial 
Inclusion’ (FI). FI ‘focuses on facilitating access to formal services for financial excluded and 
underserved groups, including low-income individuals, rural sectors, and undocumented 
groups. FI focuses on developing countries where the challenge is the greatest’ (Georgiou, 
2017). The suggestion when this was rolled out was that, via a concerted and verified risk-
based approach, the people who FI captured would be so significant that the increased 
revenue from banking the un-banked would offset the costs of complying with regulations. In 
reality, this has not been the case and banks have taken a conservative approach in the face of 
such penalties – correspondent banking, and FI moreover, is actually reducing through fear of 
being penalised. This ‘de-risking’ is having a massive effect upon correspondent banking, 
which is affecting financial inclusion in the places that need it the most. However, the focus 
of this article is on introducing Sigma Ratings to the literature so that this market-based 
offering can be assessed against this backdrop of fundamental stumbling blocks within the 
AML system.  
 
10 
 
Sigma Ratings 
 
Sigma Ratings have a clear function. Whilst their composition and outward-facing branding 
mirrors that of the established credit rating agencies, the agency is determined to define itself. 
On its website, the agency declares that ‘while we are a professional rating agency, we are 
different [from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch] in that we are rating entity-level “non-credit” risks 
such as financial crime compliance and governance, whereas credit rating agencies are 
targeting credit issues such as solvency and likelihood of default’ (Sigma Ratings, 2019). It is 
important to note immediately that this focus is something that the ‘Big Three’ credit rating 
agencies also focus upon, although their analysis of ‘non-credit’ risk factors are just some of 
many factors that factor into an overall credit rating. This is similar to the rating agencies’ 
inclusion of ESG-related data, which is an element that has witnessed a number of dedicated 
Sustainability Rating Agencies emerge to offer the same, but perhaps more bespoke and 
clearer risk analysis, just like Sigma Ratings is doing for aspects such as the analysis of 
financial crime compliance (Cash, 2018a). 
 
Sigma Ratings have a clear approach when it comes to advertising their unique offering to the 
marketplace. Again, on its website, the agency states that ‘we are re-defining the way the 
world sees risk and are utilising deep domain expertise and cutting-edge computer science to 
both rate and generate risk scores on thousands of companies around the world’. The 
agency’s co-founder, Mr Stuart Jones – a former US Treasury Official – makes this clearer 
when he states that ‘this is the world’s first business integrity rating agency’ (Jenkins, 2018). 
This concept of ‘business integrity’ is, for the agency, related to a number of key financial 
aspects that face the global marketplace today. More specifically, the agency is focusing upon 
the compliance with financial crime regulation and legislation and other aspects such as 
internal governance, an entity’s observance of financial sanctions, corruption, and an entity’s 
overall reputation. The agency was developed by former US Treasury official Stuart Jones 
and Gabrielle Haddad, a former M&A lawyer. At the time of writing, the team comprises of 
eight individuals, eight advisors – including former US Treasury official Robert Werner - and 
two experienced advisors who sit on the rating committee to ‘ensure the quality’ of the 
agency’s methodology. Whilst still only a small team, the agency has developed a clear 
structure for arriving at its ratings. 
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Sigma Ratings have adopted a similar rating scale to that of the established rating agencies 
(S&P in particular). Its rating scale ranges from ‘AAA’ to ‘C’, although they, as of yet, have 
not included additional identifiers like S&P have; for example, there are no ‘+’ and ‘-’ 
adages, nor are there any additional identifiers such as ‘creditwatches’. In terms of the rating 
process, the agency has what it calls a ‘certification process’, which consists of three major 
phases. Firstly, an entity will start the process by answering an online questionnaire about its 
customers, products on offer, internal policies, and staffing procedures. At this stage the 
entity will upload any relevant document to the agency that will assist with the rating – 
examples may include documents relating to compliance. Once this has been completed, 
Sigma Ratings has a ‘proprietary model’ that it has developed which scores the answers of 
the questionnaire against pre-determined metrics. To verify the information, the information 
contained in the questionnaire is verified by a Ratings Analyst, and then there are series of 
interviews (three) between a Ratings Analyst and the entity in question. Then, moving to the 
final stage of the process, the rating and rating report is developed and delivered to the entity. 
That information is then available to investors, regulators, and anybody else who may be 
interested, although the report can remain private at the entity’s request in order to be utilised 
internally. Finally, the agency declares that its ratings are refreshed annually. 
 
Looking above, we can see that it is the entity that initiates the ratings procedure, and this is 
because the agency utilises the infamous ‘issuer-pays’ model that the ‘Big Three’ rating 
agencies utilise (Naciri, 2015). This model describes when, rather than investors paying to 
incorporate the rating information into their investment decisions, the rated entity is the one 
who pays the firm for the rating. This conflict of interest is perhaps the most examined with 
regards to the rating agencies, and has been identified as, perhaps, one of the principal causes 
of the degeneration of standards that led to the rating agencies’ involvement in the financial 
crisis (Darbellay, 2013). However, it is worth considering the different dynamic at play with 
Sigma Ratings, as opposed to their credit rating brethren. It is true that a conflict of interest 
still remains with Sigma’s utilisation of the model because, in what is a crude understanding, 
the agency may be inclined to produce favourable ratings for the paying entity. Yet, the end 
user is different with Sigma. Investors may well use Sigma’s ratings to inform their decision 
about investing with a certain entity (let us say a large bank), but regulators have a much 
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more prominent reason for using Sigma’s ratings. It is imagined that Sigma’s ratings will be 
used by rated entities to signal to regulators their compliance with certain rules, whilst it is 
also not unimaginable that regulators will use Sigma’s ratings as ‘benchmarks’ for 
compliance rates with certain regulations. We will return to this potential outcome shortly, 
but the ‘signalling’ element described above is something that is inherently attached to the 
concept of rating and is the core of the concept known as ‘rating addiction’ (Cash, 2018b) - in 
terms of credit ratings, the rating can be used by managers to signal to disperse investors, 
used by investors to restrain management, or used by regulators to define certain practices 
within a given financial arena (they can also be used by ‘issuers’ to signal to investors and 
regulators) (Cash, 2018c). 
 
Although the rated entities pay for the ratings produced by Sigma Ratings, the agency has 
received funding from a number of sources to begin its operations. Most noticeably, Barclays 
provided the agency with $2.4 million from its fintech ‘Accelerator programme’ (who are 
among an early batch of firms incorporating Sigma’s ratings), alongside TechStars, and a 
number of so-called ‘angel investors’ from the US and ‘high growth emerging markets’. 
Interestingly, Sigma makes clear that, at the time of writing, it does not offer any advisory, 
consultancy, or ancillary services (a number of terms essentially describing additional, non-
rating services) which have become particularly lucrative for the credit rating agencies (and 
which are highly contentious). It is worth discussing why Barclays have taken an interest in 
Sigma Ratings before we move on, as its injection of capital and adoption of the agency’s 
ratings has proven to be a headline-creating boon to the new agency. In 2015, the bank was 
fined £72 million by British regulators for its ‘poor handling of financial crime risks’ 
(Jenkins, 2018) and, with its competitors HSBC and BNP Paribas being fined by American 
regulators $2 and $9 billion respectively, it is clear that the large financial institutions are 
recognising the importance of a. increasing the amount of information in relation to financial 
crime within their systems and b. transmitting this new developed approach to external 
bodies, such as regulators. It is this facet of Sigma’s offering, namely that one can transmit 
compliance via a rating, that is likely to be its biggest asset. 
 
Nevertheless, the new rating agency offers something particularly novel to the financial 
arena. The ever-increasing focus on financial crime and its wider impact is clearly on the 
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regulatory agenda. Recent fines describe for us an increased focus, and when we take into 
consideration an ever-changing geo-political landscape that is being dominated by financial 
sanctions (think of the US’ sanctioning of Russian and Iranian bodies, for example), it is 
becoming ever more important that large financial institutions both avoid such financial 
practices but more importantly are able to definitively transmit this avoidance to external 
bodies. If we return to the concept of Correspondent Banking quickly, the larger banks are at 
the mercy of AML and financial crime compliance practices within the correspondent banks 
that are not always evident. It is believed that ratings such as those produced by Sigma 
Ratings will allow the larger banking institutions to monitor their smaller affiliates much 
more efficiently.  
 
Though Sigma Ratings is the focus of this article, in truth there is little to report at the 
moment. The operation is barely underway and it is merely in the process of collaborating 
and spreading the word of its model across the business world. For us however, it is worth 
just reminding ourselves of some of the potential benefits and drawbacks of this new 
offering. The biggest potential benefit by far is that the agency can serve to reduce the costs 
for banks and their AML compliance by injecting independent information into the system. It 
is not unfathomable that, if Sigma begins to build a reputation, regulators will allow for 
Sigma’s ratings to displace some of the due diligence that Banks must undertake. However, 
this potential benefit is fundamentally tied to a potential flaw. We have seen in the credit 
rating industry how tying regulatory practices to external and private ratings can lead to 
massive contagion, like that witnessed in the Financial Crisis – every organisation that had to 
invest in AAA-rated securities, for example, did just that. The problem was that the rating 
agencies had inflated their credit ratings, within the RBMS market, across the board so when 
a number of securities collapsed, what was to follow was inevitable. If the same thing were to 
happen with Sigma, one could see a massive global issue occur given the connected nature of 
money laundering as a concept. We have discussed already how the economic, legal, and 
political are all intertwined in this arena, so a failure could lead to massive repercussions for 
society. If we connect to this the potential for Sigma to follow the pathway developed by the 
agencies and, as investigations from the Crisis have revealed, essentially seek to favour the 
paying client over everybody else (by way of ratings inflation or the production of 
ancillary/consultancy services), then the effect could be just as dire. Yet, there is a real 
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opportunity for Sigma to positively affect the marketplace with a model that is novel, 
exciting, and above all needed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The world of money laundering and the fight to stop it has been developing at quite a pace. In 
just over thirty years there is an established international collaboration aimed at providing a 
clear set of norms that are then implemented around the world. However, we have seen in this 
article that there are a number of key flaws which are prohibiting that ideal from being fully 
realised. One of the biggest flaws is that the AML regime is dependent upon the cooperation 
from the banks. Whilst the AML regime has sought to both compel and tempt the banks to 
cooperate, the core concept of a private company is trumping the full inclusion of the banks 
into the AML system. Arguably, this is to be expected, and whilst some may argue that there 
is an important social need for the banks to operate in a cooperative manner, there will be just 
as many arguing that as a private company a bank must look after itself. The reality is that 
when such a deadlock occurs there may need to be small operations that help to ease the 
process for all concerned, and in Sigma Ratings there exists this potential. Whilst Sigma 
Ratings is brand new and more research will be needed once it develops, the market-based 
solution to the core problem within the AML sphere may just work.  
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